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1. Introduction 
 
The mechanism by which monetary policy is transmitted to the real economy remains a 
central topic of debate in macroeconomics. Considerable research has recently examined 
the role played by banks in the transmission of monetary policy aiming at uncovering a 
credit channel and assessing the relative importance of the money and credit channels. 
As the credit or lending channel operates through shifts in loan-supply schedules, 
uncovering the credit channel implies distinguishing shifts in loan-supply from shifts in 
loan demand schedules brought about by monetary policy shocks. 
Distinguishing the relative importance of the money and credit channels is useful for 
various reasons. First, understanding which financial aggregates are impacted by monetary 
policy would improve our understanding of the link between the financial and the real 
sectors of the economy. Second, a better understanding of the transmission mechanism 
would help monetary authorities and analysts to interpret movements in financial 
aggregates. Finally, more information about the transmission mechanism might lead to a 
better choice of intermediate targets. In particular, if the credit channel is an important part 
of the transmission mechanism, then the banks’ asset items should be the focus of more 
attention. 
The importance of the credit channel depends on the extent to which banks rely on 
deposit financing and adjust their loan supply schedules following changes in bank 
reserves (for a given bank-dependency of the borrowers). The aim of this paper is just to 
show that bank loan supply depends on bank deposits and thus, monetary policy by 
affecting bank deposits is also able to shift loan bank supply schedules.  
At the empirical level, the bulk of the most relevant literature has tried to uncover the 
lending channel through the estimation of a reduced form equation for the bank credit 
market, with variables in first differences (i.e., stationarised variables). This paper adds to 
this area of research, but departs from previous studies on several aspects. In particular it 
is argued that the reduced form approach requires strong identifying restrictions and that it 
does not allow estimating the relevant parameters. As an alternative we suggest a 
“structural approach” which amounts to directly estimate bank loan-supply schedules, 
with variables in levels. For that purpose we resort to very recent panel data cointegration 
techniques. 
The main conclusion of the paper is that there is a banking lending channel in the 
transmission of monetary policy in the Portuguese economy and that the importance of 
this channel is larger for the less capitalised banks. Size and liquidity do not appear to be 
relevant bank characteristics in determining the importance of the lending channel.    3
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the money and credit 
views of the monetary transmission mechanism. Section 3 introduces an IS/LM model of 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism in order to clarify the restrictions, which 
underlie the conventional reduced form approach and motivate the alternative approach 
suggested in this paper. Section 4 discusses the main restrictions underlying the reduced 
form approach. Section 5 describes the “structural approach” followed in this paper and 
discusses the identification problem and the econometric approach to be implemented in 
the empirical section. Section 6 briefly characterises the Portuguese banking sector and 
the changes it underwent during the nineties. Section 7 reports the empirical results for 
Portugal and section 8 summarises the main conclusions. 
 
2.  The bank lending channel  
 
The classical textbook approach to monetary policy focus on how the central bank’s 
actions affect the households and firms portfolios, by assuming the existence of only two 
classes of assets: money and other assets (usually simply labelled as “bonds”). Under this 
approach to the monetary policy transmission mechanism, known as the money view or 
money channel of monetary policy, the central bank, by manipulating banks’ reserves is 
assumed to be able to control the quantity of money (deposits, with the banks) thereby 
affecting the nominal interest rate (the relative price of money and bonds). In turn, 
changes in nominal interest rate are expected to translate into changes of the real interest 
rate (prices are sticky in the short run) thus affecting the economy either through 
aggregate demand (IS/LM framework) or/and through aggregate supply (Christiano and 
Eichenbaum (1995) framework). Thus, according to the money view, the monetary 
transmission mechanism operates through the liability side of banks’ balance sheets. 
There are two basic necessary conditions for the money channel to work: (a) banks 
cannot perfectly shield transaction balances (deposits) from changes in reserves; and (b) 
there are no close substitutes for money in the conduct of transactions in the economy. 
The point of departure of the credit view is the rejection of the notion that all non-
monetary assets are perfect substitutes. In particular, it is assumed that internal funds, 
bank loans and other sources of financing are imperfect substitutes for firms. According to 
the credit view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, monetary policy works 
by affecting bank assets (loans) in addition to banks’ liabilities (deposits). The key point is 
that monetary policy besides shifting the supply of deposits also shifts the supply of bank 
loans. In this context, the crucial response of banks to monetary policy is their lending 
response and not their role as deposit creators. The two key necessary conditions that must   4
be satisfied for a lending channel to operate are: (a) banks cannot shield their loan 
portfolios from changes in monetary policy; and (b) borrowers cannot fully insulate their 
real spending from changes in the availability of bank credit. 
The first of these conditions tells us that banks are not able to completely offset the 
decrease in deposits brought about by monetary policy shocks, by resorting to alternative 
sources of funds (at least not without incurring in increasing costs). Because of the extra 
premium that banks have to pay to bring in alternative external funds, banks will make 
fewer loans after the fall in reserves brought about by monetary policy. Of course, it is 
expected that banks hedge against changes in monetary policy, by holding securities as a 
buffer against a reserve outflow. But such buffer is not expected to fully offset the effects 
of a contractionary monetary policy, as buffer stocks are costly for banks (in terms of 
interest foregone). 
The second condition tells us that some spending, which is financed with bank loans, 
will not occur if banks cut the loans, else the real consequences of the credit channel will 
be null. 
In summary, while the traditional theory emphasises the households’ preferences 
between money and other liquid assets (bonds) the credit view argues that the banking 
behaviour is also very important to the transmission of monetary policy
1. 
 
3.  An IS/LM model with the lending channel 
 
In this section we introduce a standard IS/LM model for analysing the monetary 
transmission mechanism at the bank level. On the one hand, the model will help us to 
                                                       
1 Some authors (for instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1995)) distinguish between “credit channel” and 
“bank-lending channel”. The transmission channel which we indistinctly labelled in this section as the 
“lending or credit channel”, is referred to by these authors as the “bank-lending channel” and they use the 
expression “credit channel” in a broader sense, which includes both the bank-lending channel and the so-
called “balance-sheet channel”. This latter channel reflects the influence of monetary policy on the net worth 
and other determinants of the financial position of potential borrowers. In this paper we do not make such a 
distinction, and in the following sections the strictly speaking bank-lending channel is referred to indistinctly 
both as the credit channel or the bank-lending channel. Readers interested in a detailed analysis of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the bank lending channel are referred, for instance, to Kashyap and Stein (1998), 
Valery Ramey (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) or Trautwein (2000), who present very good discussions 
of some of the micro-foundations that underlie the bank lending channel theory of monetary policy 
transmission mechanism.   5
understand the identifying restrictions underlying the econometric approach, which has 
been followed in the empirical literature to uncover the lending channel and, on the other 
hand, will enable us to define an alternative testing strategy. The model draws heavily on 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), but it departs from their model in the way money supply is 
modelled and monetary policy is implemented. 
Let us assume that we have an economy with three different agents or sectors and 
four assets. The agents are the non-banking sector, the banking sector and the central 
bank. The central bank sets monetary policy either by changing the reserve requirement 
ratio, setting the discount interest rate or controlling the bond rate by conducting open 
market operations. In either case banks react by changing the amount of reserves as well 
as the other items of their balance sheets. In our model we explicitly assume that the 
central bank sets monetary policy by changing the discount rate or the money market rate, 
but the model can easily be adapted to deal with other monetary policy instruments. 
The four assets are deposits held by the private sector with banks, loans granted by 
banks to the private sector, reserves held by banks for legal and liquidity reasons and 
bonds held both by banks for liquidity reasons and by the non-financial sector for liquidity 
and or portfolio reasons. 
For the money market we assume a conventional LM curve. The demand for money 
(in the form of deposits held with a typical bank) by the non-monetary sector is the 
conventional money demand function 
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where  Dt stands for the nominal deposits held by the private sector at a typical bank,  P t  
the price level,  yt  a  scale variable (for instance real GDP), π t  the inflation rate and it  
the interest rate on bonds. Below each coefficient in equation (3.1) is the corresponding 
expected sign according to the conventional economic theory
2. 
We write the (real) money supply as 
 
                                                       
2 For ease of presentation we have assumed in equation (3.1) that deposits depend on a single interest 
rate. Because  Dt  includes order as well as time deposits, a more realistic money demand function should also 
include the own rate on time deposits or a weighted average of the interest rates on total deposits. However in 
this case we would have also to explicitly model the bond market, which would make the solution of the 
model somewhat cumbersome, without changing the main points we want to make. 
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where R stands for the bank reserves, lt  for the interest rate on loans, it  for the interest 
rate on bonds and rt  for the relevant monetary policy interest rate controlled by the central 
bank. We note that equation (3.2) should be perceived as a generalisation of the textbook 
equation, according to which the money supply is equal to bank reserves times the money 
multiplier, which, in turn is a function of lt , it ,rt  and the required reserve ratio (assumed 
constant for ease of presentation). 
In equilibrium equations (3.1) and (3.2) determine the equilibrium interest it  and the 
equilibrium quantity of money for given  Py Rl ,,,,        π and r . 
Let us now focus on the credit market. The loan demand by the non-banking sector 
may be specified as  
 
ln lny
                                               
t (/)
() () () ()
CP l i t
d
ttt =+ + + +
+− − +
λλ λ πλ λ 01 2 3 4      (3.3) 
 
where  yt  captures the transactions demand for credit, π t  the uncertainty in the economy 
and it  the possibility of the private sector to have access to sources of funding which are 
not perfect substitutes of bank loans. The null λ 3 0 ≠  captures the idea that borrowers 
cannot fully insulate their real spending from changes in the availability of bank credit. 
For the loan supply we have 
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where it is assumed that the loan supply depends on the level of total deposits held by the 
private sector with the banks, on the inflation rate as a measure of uncertainty in the 
economy as well as on the loan and bond interest rates
 3. Assets held by banks in the form 
of bonds are seen as substitutes for loans, held mainly for liquidity reasons. The null 
                                                       
3 The specification of the loan supply equation with deposits as an explanatory variable closely follows 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988). The introduction of such a variable in the supply schedule may be justified in 
theoretical terms in the context of a profit-maximizing bank, in which the amount of deposits is out of the 
control of the bank being determined by central bank policy. See, for instance Kashyap and Stein (1995) and 
Courakis (1988). We shall return to this issue further below in the empirical section, in which we argue for the 
need of the loan supply equation to also account for the banks’ own capital.   7
α 1 0 ≠  in (3.4) captures the idea that banks cannot shield their loan portfolios from 
changes in monetary policy, i.e., from changes in deposits brought about by monetary 
policy and plays a central role in our analysis. Also important is the coefficient α 3  as it 
determines the slope of the supply curve. 
Equilibrium in the credit market will determine the equilibrium loan interest rate, lt , 
and the equilibrium quantity of real bank credit, ln( / ) CP t , for given  yt ,  ln(DP t /) , 
π t  and it . Finally, plugging the equilibrium values for it  and ln( / ) DP t  obtained from 
the money market into the equilibrium equations for lt  and ln( / ) CP t  we find the 
reduced form equations for lt  and ln( / ) CP t  as a function of the exogenous variables of 
the model: ln( / ) , ln , RP y tt t    π  and rt . 
As we saw in the previous section the lending channel operates through shifts in the 
loan supply curve in response to changes in monetary policy. To see how it operates in our 
model, let us assume, for instance, that the central bank increases the discount rate, rt . 
This will reduce the equilibrium quantity of money in the economy, i.e., deposits in our 
model, through the interaction between money supply and money demand schedules (3.1) 
and (3.2). In turn, the drop in deposits held by the private sector with the banks shifts the 
loan supply schedule upwards if α 1 0 >  in (3.4). It is this additional transmission 
mechanism – the upward shift in supply of loans – which is known in the literature as the 
bank-lending channel. As mentioned above, at the micro level the existence of a lending 
channel rests on the assumption that banks cannot easily replace lost deposits with other 
sources of funds, such as certificates of deposits or new equity issues, or by selling 
securities. Otherwise, we would expect α 1 not to be significantly different from zero. Of 
course for the upward shift to occur the supply curve cannot be horizontal. In other words 
we need the additional assumption that α 3  in (3.4) is finite.  
To test the existence of the credit channel and evaluate its importance we need to 
estimate α 1 and α 3  in equation (3.4), and test whether α 1 is significantly different from 
zero and positive and that α 3  is not very large. The credit channel is the more important 
the larger α 1 and the smaller α 3 . In empirical terms, this upward shift in the loan supply 
needs to be clearly distinguished from the simultaneously expected inward shift in loan 
demand (the so-called money view). This is the well-known identification problem, which 
we address in the following section. 
 
4.  What are the difficulties with the reduced form approach? 
 
So far, in the literature, the bulk of tests for the existence of a credit channel of monetary 
policy has been carried out by estimating reduced form equations for bank credit. Most of   8
these tests acknowledge the existence of an identification problem, which amounts to 
distinguish shifts in banks’ loan supply from shifts in banks’ loan demand schedules
4. In 
this section we address this issue in the context of the model presented in section 3, by 
explicitly deriving the restrictions that underlie its reduced form equation for credit. To 
that end we derive the reduced form of the model introducing only two minor changes. 
First, we introduce an additional variable in the supply function (3.4) to allow for 
interaction effects that capture bank specific sources of heterogeneity. Thus, equation (3.4) 
now reads as 
 
ln ln D/ P ln D/ P
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where  zit  measures a bank specific characteristic such as size, liquidity or capitalisation. 
The term α 2 ln( / ) DPz it it  intends to capture the idea that shifts in the supply curve 
brought about by monetary policy changes depend on some banks’ specific characteristics 
(size, liquidity, capitalisation, etc.), as the lending channel theory predicts. In principle we 
expect that α 2 0 <  so that loan-supply shifts are larger for small, less liquid or less 
capitalised banks. 
The second change in the model of section 3 is that, for ease of presentation, we 
assume that in equation (3.2) we have γ 2 0 = , so that money supply does not directly 
depend on the credit interest rate. This simplifying assumption does not change the 
conclusions vis-à-vis the general model, but makes the solution of the model much easier 
to derive and analyse. Solving the model with equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (4.1), the 
reduced form equation for real credit reads as
5  
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4 Some important references in this area of research are: Romer and Romer (1990), Bernanke and 
Blinder (1992), Kashyap et al. (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1995 and 2000), Favero et al. (1999), Kishan 
and Opiela (2000) and Jayaratne and Morgan (2000). 
5 The full solution of the model is derived in the Appendix 1.   9
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First of all we note that equation (4.2) is similar to the ones estimated in the literature 
with the possible exception of the terms concerning the banks’ reserves, which are usually 
not included. However the banks’ reserves would drop from equation (4.2) had we 
assumed γ 1 0 =  in (3.2), so that money supply would not depend directly on the amount 
of reserves
6.  
There are some important points to note about equation (4.2). The first important 
point to note is that we may have α 1 0 =  in (4.3), but θ 3 0 ≠  or θ 3 0 =  in (4.2) with 
α 1 0 > . Thus, as recognised in the literature, the fact that the coefficient of rt  in the 
estimated reduced form equation is significantly negative does not imply the existence of 
the lending channel. Moreover, the sign of θ 3 is not unambiguously negative, as the term 
() αλ λα 43 43 −  in (4.3) may be either positive or negative. 
In order to identify (the sign of) α 1 we need to impose some restrictions on the 
model. For instance, the coefficient θ 3 will be certainly negative if () αλ λα 43 43 0 −> . 
Also, it turns out that if we assume what we shall call the “spread condition” i.e., that 










      (4.5) 
 
which is expected to be negative. In this case, θ 3 will be zero if (and only if) α 1 0 = , 
given that by assumption we must have the other parameters in (4.5) different from zero. 
Thus, under this hypothesis, if in equation (4.2) the estimated θ 3 is significantly negative 
we may conclude for the existence of the lending channel not only because α 1 0 > , but 
also because α 3 cannot be very large (else the estimated θ 3 will be very small). In any 
case we cannot say anything about the importance of the credit channel, because we 
cannot obtain an estimate for α 1. We also note that the “spread condition” cannot be 
tested nor imposed during the estimation process.  
                                                       
6 We note however that some authors have also estimated equations with bank reserves as a regressor 
(see, for instance Favero et al (1999)), but in this case, with no interest rate. According to (4.2) a general 
reduced form equation should consider both the central bank interest rate and bank reserves as regressors.   10
As a second point we note that even under the “spread condition” the possibility of 
inferring the signs of α 1 and α 2  crucially depends on the additional assumptions of loan 
interest rate homogeneity (λ 3 in the loan demand and α 3 in the loan supply being the 
same, for instance, for large and small banks or for liquid or illiquid banks) and money 
interest rate homogeneity (γ 4 in money supply and β 3  in the money demand being the 
same for large and small banks or for liquid or illiquid banks)
7. If one of these 
assumptions does not hold the corresponding source of heterogeneity will show up in 
different expressions for θ 3 and θ 4  in the reduced form (4.2) and the “spread condition” 
would no longer be sufficient to ensure the identification of the sign of the coefficients α 1 
and α 2 . 
In practice, whether the above simplifying assumptions are seen as “too much 
restrictive” or rather as “acceptably restrictive” to allow interesting conclusions is 
ultimately a matter of sensitivity of the empirical researcher. In our opinion, both the 
“spread” condition as well as the loan supply interest rate homogeneity condition appear 
as important restrictions. In particular we note that θ 3 and θ 4  in equations (4.4) and (4.5) 
depend on α 3  and, as we have seen in the previous section, the importance of the lending 
channel (also) depends on α 3 , so that in order to test for the relative importance of the 
lending channel across different banks it appears that we should also allow the loan supply 
own interest rate (semi) elasticity to vary according to the specific bank characteristic
8. 
Thirdly, it is readily seen that resorting to bank specific characteristics does not help 
to uncover the bank-lending channel. In fact, θ 4  is not a function of α 1 and as zt  
measures differences (of bank size, liquidity ratio, etc.) from the average (size, liquidity 
ratio, etc.), α 2zt  measures banks specific supply shifts vis-à-vis the aggregate average 
supply shift given by α 1
9. So, the coefficient θ 4  (to the extent that it is a function of α 2 ) 
                                                       
7 It may be argued that interest rate money demand homogeneity is not likely to hold if large banks, say, 
attract a larger proportion of large depositors, as they presumably do with larger borrowers.  
8 We shall argue bellow in the empirical section that in order to draw interesting conclusions on the 
relative importance of the lending channel for two different banks (in terms of size, liquidity, etc.) we must 
allow not only the coefficient of deposits to vary across banks (as we did in (4.1) through the coefficient α 2 ), 
but also to allow the coefficient of lt  to vary across different banks (by introducing a term such as α 6lz ti t  in 
(4.1)). However, it turns out that the reduced form approach is not capable of dealing with such a 
generalisation, as in this case the reduced form coefficients θ j  are a non-linear function of the  zit  variable, 
raising insurmountable estimation and interpretation problems. 
9 In fact if the variable  zt  were correctly defined, we would expect the aggregate interaction effect 
across banks, for each time period, given by    11
allows one to distribute the average effect (given by α 1) across banks, (according to their 
size, liquidity, etc.), but the existence of a lending channel, at the aggregate level, rests 
always and solely on the coefficient θ 3 of rt  in (4.2). In this sense we may say that by 
resorting to panel data does not help solving the identification problem of the reduced 
form equation, but only to avoid some potential bias due to, otherwise, neglected 
heterogeneity in the banks supply schedule. 
Notice also that, in principle, we cannot have θ 3 0 =  and θ 4 0 >  because in this case 
the average lending channel will eventually be zero (α 1 0 = ) and banks with size, 
liquidity or capitalisation ratios above average would exhibit a downwards supply shift 
and not an upwards supply shift as the lending channel predicts. 
Finally we note that the reduced form equation and the interpretation of the 
corresponding coefficients in (4.2) depend on the underlying structural model. This 
includes not only the specific loan supply and demand equations, but also the demand and 
supply functions for money and the type of monetary policy instrument used by the central 
bank (discount interest rate, open-market operations or the required reserves coefficient). 
In general, we note that the general reduced form (4.2) is consistent with a huge set of 
different structural models, provide they have ln yt ,  π t ,  rt ,  ln( / ) RP t  and zt  as the 
exogenous variables, and that the specific reduced form varies according to the monetary 
policy instrument used by the central bank. 
In the context of the reduced form approach an alternative equation to (4.2) could be 
obtained if one assumes that deposits are perceived as exogenous at the bank level. This 
equation can be derived from a simple structural model involving only the credit demand 
and credit supply equations. This framework seems to be quite a reasonable one, as the 
existence of the lending channel rests on the assumption of deposits exogeneity at the 
aggregate level i.e., that deposits are determined by the central bank monetary policy
10. If 
we assume that at the bank level, deposits as well as the bond interest rate are exogenous, 
then we may stick to a “structural model” consisting only of equations (3.3) and (4.1). In 
this case the reduced form equation reads as  
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to add up to zero (with some possible exceptions that will be discussed in the empirical section, below). 
10 We note that the exogeneity of deposits, at the aggregate level is a pre-condition for the existence of 
the credit channel. The assumption of deposits exogeneity will be discussed below in the empirical section.   12
 
where now deposits and the bond interest rate appear as regressors instead of the monetary 
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Now we can see, that in this case, there is no identification problem as we have 
θ 3 0 >  if and only if α 1 0 >  (and α 3  is not very large)
 11. Similarly for θ 4. Thus, 
estimating equation (4.6) (or a dynamic generalisation of equation (4.6)), with first 
differenced variables (to account for data non-stationarities) would probably be a sensible 
way to proceed when the time series dimension of the data does not allow resorting to 
estimation techniques capable of dealing with the endogeneity of some regressors, which 
will necessarily arise if we try to directly estimate some “structural” equation, namely the 
credit supply function (4.1). We deal with this issue in the next section. 
 
5.  Defining an alternative empirical approach 
 
Given the difficulties with the reduced form approach pointed out in the previous section 
we will try to identify the existence of the credit channel by directly estimating the supply 
curve (3.4) or (4.1) or some generalisation of these equations. However, as it is well 
known, the direct estimation of structural equations raises an estimation as well as an 
identification problem. 
The identification of demand and supply schedules is discussed for instance in 
Intrilligator et al. (1996, p. 528) and in Zha (1997). The basic idea is that the supply curve 
is identified provide the demand curve includes at least one explanatory variable that does 
not enter the supply equation. We assume that deposits and the bond interest rate are 
exogenous at the bank level and so our working model should be perceived as being 
composed solely of the credit demand and credit supply curves. Under this assumption, 
we can see that, as they stand, the supply curve (3.4) and the demand curve (3.3) are 
identified. The supply curve is identified because the demand curve includes ln yt  as an 
                                                       
11 We note that in rigour one still needs the loan interest rate homogeneity assumption (α 3 and λ 3  not 
dependent on the bank specific characteristics).   13
additional regressor and the demand curve is identified because the supply curve includes 
ln( / ) DP  as an additional regressor. 
Notice that for estimation purposes we do not need to specify the demand schedule. 
All we need is to be aware of the existence of such a function with one regressor that does 
not enter the supply function. In terms of the model defined by (3.3) and (3.4), 
identification will be “lost” if we also include ln yt  in equation (3.4). Some readers will 
probably argue that this is likely to be the case, because the supply of credit by banks 
could also depend on GDP as a measure of the “risk” or uncertainty in the economy. Of 
course in the limiting case one could argue that any variable entering the demand curve 
should also enter the supply curve. In this case the identification will be impossible and 
there will not be a way out of this process. Thus, in the analysis that follows we implicitly 
assume that for each estimated supply function there is a corresponding demand function, 
which allows identifying the estimated supply function. This only requires that we assume 
the existence of a demand equation, which includes a regressor not included in the supply 
equation. 
This alternative approach has the advantage of not requiring the imposition of any 
sort of “spread condition” or any type of homogeneity condition to obtain the 
identification of the lending channel. Also it allows one to get (direct) point estimates of 
the relevant coefficients, which is not the case of the “reduced form” approach. Last but 
not least, this alternative approach is immune to the specific type of monetary policy 
instrument assumed to be used by the central bank. This again contrasts with the reduced 
form approach in which the specific equation does depend on the type of instrument used 
by the central bank, as we mentioned in the previous section. But, of course the now 
proposed alternative approach also depends on two critical assumptions: deposits 
exogeneity and econometric identification of the supply curve. In our opinion the 
“econometric identification condition” is not a very restrictive assumption as it is 
customarily assumed in the relevant literature whenever separate supply and demand 
schedules are estimated. The assumption of deposits exogeneity is probably the major 
limitation of our approach, but we argue below that this seems to be an issue deserving 
further research also at the theoretical level. 
Let us now address the estimation issue. So far in the literature the empirical models, 
using panel data, have been estimated with variables in first differences to circumvent the 
potential non-stationarity problem arising from the time-series dimension of the data. 
However it is well known that in most cases this approach does not solve the   14
inconsistency problem, especially if the estimated model still includes specific effects and 
lagged endogenous variables
12. 
On the other hand, this approach neglects from the start the possibility of a levels 
relation among the relevant variables. In other words these approach discards the 
possibility of a long run effect of monetary policy on deposits and credit. This is at odds 
with the usual approach in the literature, which postulates a levels relationship for the 
money (or credit) demand, in which the (real) stock of money (or credit) is modelled as a 
function of GDP, say, and the levels of some relevant interest rates.  
During the last five years or so a very important strand of the literature on models of 
panel data has been concerned with the analysis of the consequences of using panels with 
a large time-series dimension. The main results available so far concern unit root and 
cointegration tests on panel data as well as the asymptotic properties of some well known 
estimators when the variables in the model are integrated of order one, I(1) and T (the 
time dimension) and N (the cross section dimension) are large.
 13 
In the empirical section below we basically estimate loan-supply functions, which are 
generalisations of (3.4) or (4.1). These equations must be seen as cointegrating relations, 
which in the limit can be estimated for individual banks. Being static relations, the 
estimated coefficients should be read as the long run effects. By introducing interaction 
effects as in (4.1), this approach also allows testing whether the long run effect of 
monetary policy differs across banks, according to size, liquidity or capitalisation ratios.  
Under the assumption of cointegration Phillips and Moon (1999) have shown that the 
Pooled OLS estimator (POLS) is consistent when T and N tend to infinity and has a 
normal limit distribution, provide the condition (/ ) NT→ 0 is met. Notice that 
asymptotic normality is specific to panel data, as it does not hold in pure time-series data. 
The rate of consistency depends on the initial assumptions about the model. The condition 
(/ ) NT→ 0 indicates that this asymptotic theory results are likely to be useful in practice 
when N is moderate and T is large. We can expect such data configuration when we have 
panels with a large time-series dimension and where the relevant cross-section dimension 
is not very large. 
                                                       
12 See Alvarez and Arellano (1998) for a survey on the asymptotic properties of various estimators, in 
dynamic panels, with stationary regressors. 
13  In what concerns the asymptotic properties of the estimators important papers are Phillips and Moon 
(1999), Kao and Chiang (2000), Pedroni (1996), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), Binder, Hsiao and Pesaran 
(2000), Pesaran and Shin (1995). Interesting surveys on the subject are Phillips and Moon (2000), Baltagi and 
Kao (2000) and Banerjee (1999).   15
In the empirical section below we use 8 years of quarterly data (32 quarterly 
observations) for 18 banks (we only consider the case of a complete panel). With T=32 
and N=18 the asymptotic theory with the (/ ) NT→ 0 condition, becomes the useful 
reference.  
If we assume that the true model is heterogeneous (different parameters for different 
individuals or banks) the estimators are  N  consistent for the so-called long-run average 
coefficients. Super-consistency is not obtained because the effect of heterogeneity in the 
cointegration parameters is to slow down the rate of convergence of the pooled estimator. 
If we assume that the underlying model is homogeneous (the same coefficients for all 
the individuals) the POLS estimator (which corresponds to the within estimator) is  NT  
consistent and has a limiting normal distribution, under the additional assumption of 
strictly exogenous regressors, but is consistent (not super-consistent) if the regressors are 
correlated with the residuals, because of the persistence of bias effects. 
For the case of a homogeneous panel with endogenous regressors the authors suggest 
using the Panel Fully-Modified OLS estimator (PFMOLS). This estimator is a simple 
generalisation of the well-known Fully-Modified OLS estimator introduced in Phillips and 
Hansen (1990) for pure time-series models. The PFMOLS estimator is  NT  consistent 
and has a normal limit distribution
14.  
In addition to POLS and PFMOLS two other estimators were also suggested in the 




6.  Monetary policy and banking sector developments in Portugal during the 
nineties 
 
During the second half of the 80’s economic policy in Portugal was driven by the need to 
implement the Single Market programme. Fundamental changes in the economic policy 
framework as well as in the banking sector occurred in this period. These include 
                                                       
14 The fully modified OLS is constructed by making corrections for endogeneity and serial correlation to 
the OLS estimator. The endogeneity correction use the so called “long-run” covariance matrix defined for the 
residuals of the model and the first differences of the regressors, while the serial correlation correction uses 
elements from this matrix and also from the so-called “one sided long-run” covariance matrix. The 
expressions for the computation of the PFMOLS estimator may be seen in Phillips and Moon (1999) or Kao 
and Chiang (2000). 
15 See, for instance, Kao and Chiang (2000).   16
liberalisation measures as the opening up of the banking sector to private initiative and the 
beginning of the process of elimination of administrative controls on interest rates, on 
bank credit as well as on capital movements. The credit limits were abolished by 1991. 
Since then monetary policy has focused on the setting of cash reserves for the banking 
system to control liquidity growth. With the revision of the Banco de Portugal statute, in 
1995, price stability became explicitly the primary objective of the central bank, subject to 
the overall economic policy of the government. 
In order to approximate the Portuguese regime to those of most EU members and to 
create an operational framework similar to the one that would be adopted by the European 
Central Bank the Banco de Portugal also introduced new policy instruments and new 
forms of intervention in the money market. A daily credit facility was created (1993), 
allowing banks subject to minimum reserve requirements to raise funds overnight at pre-
announced rates, as well as an absorption facility (1994)
16. In November 1994 the reserve 
requirement regime was redefined. Its major change was the reduction in the minimum 
reserve requirement ratio from 17 per cent (remunerated) to 2 per cent (non-remunerated). 
The consequent liquidity sterilisation was achieved through the issuing of Deposit 
Certificates by the Banco the Portugal. 
Exchange rate stability became progressively the intermediate target to reach the final 
goal of price stability. In 1992 the escudo joined the ERM and the remaining capital 
controls were removed. With this decision monetary policy had to be used almost 
exclusively to ensure that the exchange rate was kept within the ERM fluctuation bands. 
The explicit restrictions on the composition of banks’ assets, namely the compulsive 
investment in public debt, were removed and the legally imposed segmentation of banking 
activities was gradually eliminated, culminating in the establishment of universal banking 
in late 1992. 
With the opening up to private initiative the banking sector expanded fast. Between 
1984 and 1989 the number of banks operating in Portugal increased from 14 to 27 and 
between 1989 and 1997 this number more than doubled to 58
17. State-owned banks 
continued to hold the bulk of banking business until late in the decade, but the presence of 
new banks modified considerably the competitive context in which Portuguese banks 
operated. The last step in the liberalisation of the Portuguese banking system was the re-
privatisation process of nationalised banks that started in 1989, gradually transferring to 
                                                       
16 The interest rate of the absorption facility sets a lower limit to very short-term money market rates. Its 
upper limit was set by the overnight credit facility rate. Within that band money markets were stabilised 
through repos, which made the repo rate the most important one for steering markets. 
17 In the end of 2000 there were 62 institutions.   17
private management most of banking business. More recently, as in the other European 
markets, the prospect of EMU largely motivated a process of take-overs that has 
intensified since 1994. Through this process the largest Portuguese bank groups aimed at 
being able to compete in the enlarged European market. 
The framework where the Portuguese banks operated changed significantly in 
consequence of the liberalisation process summarised above, affecting necessarily their 
behaviour, in particular their loan supply. On the other hand the changes observed in 
credit aggregates also reflected the different demand conditions created under the impact 
of European integration first and the participation in EMU afterwards. 
The upward shift on households’ permanent income resulting from European 
integration affected private consumption and consequently the loan demand by 
households. Furthermore, the adjustment of the capital stock to a new output trend has 
translated into an increase in investment of non-financial firms that has also been reflected 
in their demand of bank financing. At the same time, the stability of the exchange rate 
since mid-1993 and the decline of the inflation rate allowed a sustained and significant 
reduction of both short and long run interest rates. The decrease in nominal interest rates, 
perceived as being permanent, reduced the liquidity constraints of the economic agents 
also contributing to the strong growth in overall credit demand. 
Chart 1 shows aggregate quarterly figures on the evolution of bank loans granted to 
the private non-financial sectors of the economy as well as the evolution of aggregate 
deposits held with the banks by the private non-financial sectors
18. After the deceleration 
in the recession period between 1992 and 1994 (average annual growth rate in real terms 
of 5.4 per cent), in 1995-1997 credit resumed the upward trend of the early nineties 
(average annual growth rate in real terms of 14 per cent in this period compared to 16 per 
cent in 1991) and strongly accelerated in 1998 and 1999 (annual growth rate in real terms 
of 24 per cent). Until 1994 deposits behave very much like credit (even though with a 
slightly smaller annual growth rate), but from 1995/1996 onwards they clearly exhibited a 
much smaller growth rate than this aggregate (5.2 per cent in real terms during the period 
1995-1997 and 6 per cent in 1998/1999). As a matter of fact, during the nineties, the 
decline in interest rates reduced the incentives to save and deposits became less attractive 
vis-à-vis alternative instruments (e.g. the acquisition of shares in the re-privatisation 
process, or the investment in mutual funds that showed up in a developing financial 
market).  
                                                       
18Those figures have been computed from data on the sample of banks for which consistent series 
throughout the period 1990-1998 may be obtained. This is the sample of banks used in the econometric 
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This apparently diverging developments in credit and deposits have been the 
consequence of a significant change in the framework where the Portuguese banks 
operate. Even before the Stage Three of EMU, with the elimination of capital controls on 
the one hand and a significant reduction of the exchange risk of the escudo on the other, 
the Portuguese banks have had easy access to financing in international money markets. 
As we shall see these developments are likely to be responsible for the “structural break” 
undergone by our estimated relations in the next section. 
Chart 2 presents the evolution of the main non-deposits financing sources. It can be 
seen that the increase in the growth rate of loans coincided with a decrease of the 
government bonds in banks’ portfolios and an increase in the (net) funds obtained in the 
international money markets. Banks partly substituted their investment in government 
securities by credit to private non-financial sectors. This whole process seems basically to 
have started in 1995 and accelerated in 1998. As a matter of fact, the weight of 
government securities in banks’ balance sheets declined significantly from 19.5 per cent 
of total assets in 1992 to 5.7 per cent in 1998 (13.4 per cent in 1995). Portuguese banks 
have also been financed through credit/deposit operations with foreign banks. The weight 
of deposits held by foreign MFIs on total liabilities increased from 5.8 per cent in 1992 to 
15.3 per cent in 1998 (11.8 in 1995). In 1995 the Portuguese banks in our sample were net 
creditors in the international money market but this situation was reversed as of 1996. 
 
7.  Empirical evidence using micro bank data for Portugal 
 
In the empirical analysis on the incidence of the credit channel in the transmission of 
monetary policy for the Portuguese economy, we use balance sheet information on a 
sample of banks for which consistent data throughout 1990/1-1998/4 is available. 
The process of bank mergers that occurred during the sample period has been taken 
into account by treating bank groups as individual institutions and by repeating back 
through the whole sample period the structure of groups prevailing in 1998. Merging 
banks for which data for the complete period was not available were excluded from the 
sample. The implementation of these criteria left us with a sample of 18 banks
19. 
 
                                                       
19 Data on banks’ balance sheet items were taken from the data reported by the Portuguese banks to the 
Banco de Portugal for the purpose of compilation of aggregate monetary statistics. Since the third quarter of 
1997 the definitions of balance sheet items comply with the “ESCB implementation package”, some of the 
series having been recollected back so that comparable series on the main items may be obtained.   20
Table 1 
Main banks’ balance sheet items as a percentage of the total assets: all banks 
  1992 1995 1998 
Assets     
Credit to private non-financial sector  42.5  37.2  38.8 
Domestic  money  market  2.3 3.4 5.1 
Government securities  19.5  13.4  5.7 
Deposits in foreign MFIs  5.7  14.6  10.9 
Liabilities     
Deposits of private non-financial sector  65.6  55.8  42.8 
Domestic  money  market  2.1 3.2 4.8 
Capital  9.5 7.7 6.0 
Deposits of foreign MFIs  5.8  11.8  15.3 
 
Average total assets of the 18 banks in our sample, amounted to €12.5 billion in 
December 1998 (87 percent of the assets of the whole banking system)
20. For one third of 
these 18 banks total assets stood above the average level. In 1998 these 6 largest banks, 
each with total assets greater than €6 billion, could be seen as large banks in absolute 
terms, their market share in terms of total assets (of the 18 banks) being 87 per cent. 
From Table 1, which presents the average structure of banks’ balance sheets for some 
selected years, we can see that for the 18 banks in our sample, credit granted to the private 
non-monetary domestic sectors of the economy amounted to approximately 39 per cent of 
their total assets in 1998, 3.7 and 3.3 percentage points less than in 1992 and 1995 
respectively. On the liabilities’ side of the balance sheet total deposits held by the private 
non-monetary sector with the 18 banks decreased from 65.6 per cent of total assets in 
1992 to 42.8 per cent in 1998. 
Table 2 presents the balance sheet structure separately for the 6 largest banks, 4 
medium size banks and the 8 smallest banks in the sample. Tables 3 and 4 separate 
respectively the most and the less liquid and the most and the less capitalised banks
21. 
 
                                                       
20 In December 1998, the credit and deposits in these 18 banks amounted to 96 per cent and 98 per cent 
of the total credit and total deposits, respectively. 
21 The criteria to define the sub-samples were based on average size, liquidity and capitalisation of each 
bank in the whole sample period.   21
Table 2 
Main banks’ balance sheet items as a percentage of the total assets according to bank size 
  6 largest banks 
4 medium size 
banks 
8 smallest banks 
  1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 
Assets           
Credit to private non-
financial sector 
42.0 36.6 38.0 46.9 53.2 65.1 46.0 31.5 24.0 
Domestic money 
market 
2.2 3.4 5.8 2.5 3.0 0.8 3.8 2.9 0.9 
Government 
securities 
20.5  13.8 6.0 10.7 8.0  1.9 10.8  13.8 5.0 
Deposits in foreign 
MFIs 
5.4 15.1  11.2 8.4 10.1  10.1 9.9 12.7 7.8 
Liabilities           
Deposits of private 
non-financial sector 
66.8 57.1 44.0 62.5 62.4 57.1 41.0 27.5 12.3 
Domestic money 
market 
1.7 3.0 5.1 2.7 4.1 3.6  11.4  6.1 2.7 
Capital  9.5 7.8 6.3 9.1 8.3 6.0  11.2  5.3 1.5 
Deposits of foreign 
MFIs 
5.2  11.4 15.0  8.9  9.1  13.7 15.4 20.5 20.9 
 
According to data in Table 2 the credit share is the highest for banks of medium size 
and the smallest for the small size banks. In turn, the deposit share is larger in 
large/medium banks and decreased in all types of banks. The proportion of assets invested 
in government securities is on average larger for large banks but it has decreased rapidly 
in all banks from 1995 to 1998. Larger banks have been net creditors in the domestic 
money market while smaller banks have been net debtors. In the international money 
market, large and medium size banks were net creditors in 1995 but they became net 
debtors in the most recent years. Smaller banks reinforced their debtor position. 
Data on Table 3 shows that the credit share diminishes when liquidity increases (as 
one would expect) but there is no regularity in the deposits share according to the liquidity 
ratio. Also, there seems not to be any regularity concerning the weight of foreign money 
market operations or the weight of investment in government securities in total assets 
according to the liquidity ratio, during the sample period.   22
Table 3 
Main banks’ balance sheet items as a percentage of the total assets according to bank 
according to bank liquidity 
  6 most liquid banks 
4 medium liquidity 
banks 
8 less liquid banks 
  1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 
Assets           
Credit to private non-
financial sector 
37.7 34.1 34.8 49.0 40.1 43.5 50.4 50.7 44.1 
Domestic money 
market 
2.6 3.6 7.1 1.7 3.1 3.4 2.4 2.6 0.6 
Government 
securities 
22.6  13.3  5.5  16.0  14.7  7.0 9.8 7.5 1.5 
Deposits in foreign 
MFIs 
6.7 15.9  13.2 3.6 13.4 8.2  8.6  9.7  7.9 
Liabilities           
Deposits of private 
non-financial sector 
63.5 50.7 38.1 70.6 66.1 53.0 56.4 45.8 31.7 
Domestic money 
market 
2.2 4.1 7.5 1.1 1.0 1.1 6.9 7.0 2.9 
Capital  9.7 7.3 6.3 9.2 8.3 6.1  10.0  7.4 3.4 
Deposits of foreign 
MFIs 
6.8  13.6 17.1  3.1  8.2  12.2 11.4 14.7 16.3 
 
From Table 4 one concludes that the credit share is basically the same regardless the 
capitalisation ratio, but no clear tendency exists for the deposits share. On the other hand 
there seems to be a tendency for less capitalised banks to exhibit larger shares of 
government bonds and for more capitalised banks to exhibit a larger share of deposits of 
foreign MFIs. 
Let us now focus on the econometric results. As expected, some preliminary tests 
showed that in the last years of the sample the relation between credit granted to private 
sector and deposits underwent a huge structural break. As the consequences of this 
structural break seem to be more damaging for the estimated models when we introduce 
data for 1998 we decided to exclude the observations for this last year from the analysis. 
 
   23
Table 4 
Main banks’ balance sheet items as a percentage of the total assets according to bank 
according to bank capitalisation 
 




8 less capitalised 
banks 
  1992 1995 1998 1992 1995 1998 1992 1995  1998 
Assets           
Credit to private 
non-financial 
sector 
43.7 41.9 39.9 42.4 37.3 41.3 42.3 36.5  35.6 
Domestic money 
market 
2.9 2.9 0.9 2.6 4.1 6.9 1.7 2.4  3.6 
Government 
securities 
10.6  10.6 2.3 19.0  12.3 6.1 21.8  15.4  5.6 
Deposits in 
foreign MFIs 
10.7 15.1 12.7  5.8  16.6 12.7  4.8  11.7  8.4 




55.3 47.4 33.8 65.2 57.6 47.7 68.1 54.1  38.1 
Domestic money 
market 
3.4 4.2 2.6 1.8 3.6 6.3 2.4 2.5  3.3 
Capital  11.2  9.5 5.0  10.0  8.4 6.9 8.4 6.4  4.9 
Deposits of 
foreign MFIs 
11.9 18.5 16.1  5.7  12.3 15.9  4.9  10.1  14.3 
 
As we have seen the intensification of credit growth in 1998 is likely to be the result 
of a progressively reduced exchange risk, which strongly reduced the “true” cost of 
external financing, not captured by our available measure. For this reason we think that it 
is not sensible to use data later than 1997 to test the existence and importance of the credit 
channel, at the country level, for EU countries, because monetary policy was no longer set 
at the country level and the funds available to the banks were also no longer defined at the 
country level. 
Of course this option further reduces the time dimension of our panel to eight years 
of quarterly data, which may appear as a very short sample given the cointegration 
approach followed in this paper. We notice however that in case of panel data the cross-  24
section dimension of the data also plays an important role in establishing the properties of 
the estimators. Also, for the cointegration approach to be valid the ultimately decisive 
criterion is always the outcome of the cointegration tests. As it will be pointed out below, 
the null of non-cointegration is always strongly rejected in our estimated equations and 
this clearly legitimates our approach. 
As explained in section 5 we directly estimate loan-supply functions, which are 
generalisations of (3.4) and (4.1). However an important point regarding these equations is 
now in order. The basic loan-supply specification estimated in this section includes bank 
capital as an additional regressor. We may justify the introduction of such regressor on 
two different grounds. In econometric terms, one can argue that if it is not included, then 
deposits would be the single variable capturing “scale” effects in our supply function and 
the results would likely be biased towards favouring the conclusion of the existence of the 
credit channel i.e., α 1 0 ≠  in equation (3.4) or (4.1). In order to overcome this criticism 
we may include additional regressors in our estimated equations to account for the bank 
specific characteristics that explain the part of the growing trend in bank credit not 
accounted for by growth in deposits or other included regressors
22. The introduction of the 
bank capital in our estimated equation may also be justified on theoretical grounds. For 
instance, Courakis (1988) develops a model for banking behaviour in which banks, in 
order to maximise profits, are assumed to decide on the amount of each asset (reserves, 
loans, securities, etc.) and each liability (money market funds, certificates of deposits, etc.) 
that they are able to control. Balance sheet items not controlled by the bank or that the 
bank cannot manipulate in the short run are treated as exogenous (capital, for instance). 
The author shows that in this case the amount of each asset held by the bank (liabilities are 
treated as negative assets) is a function of the interest rates on all the assets (including 
liabilities) as well as of the levels of the items assumed exogenous to be bank. 
So, in the context of the Courakis model our loan supply function can be interpreted 
as resulting from a profit maximising behaviour of a bank in which both deposits and 
capital are treated as exogenous. The bank is assumed to choose the volume of credit, 
securities and external finance, in order to maximise the expected profits for a given level 
                                                       
22 In these situations it is customary to include a linear time trend into the regression (or several time 
trends, which in the limit may be bank specific). This linear trend, which is usually seen as a proxy for all the 
omitted regressors is better justified in terms of the cointegration results. If the variables (integrated of order 
one with a non zero drift) are deterministically cointegrated there is no need for the introduction of time 
trends, but if the variables are only stochastically cointegrated then we need to “explain” the deterministic part 
of the credit growth not accounted for by the included regressors, by introducing a time trend (or bank specific 
time trends) into the regression. In our case there seems to be no need for the use of such time trends.   25
of deposits and capital. The possibility of other forms of external financing alternative to 
deposits and capital (money market funds, certificates of deposits, etc.) is taken into 
account by introducing into the credit equation an interest rate representing the cost of 
such funds. Our basic equation now reads as: 
 
ln ln D / P
                                                (+)                                  ( )    (
it (/) ( ) l n (/)
() () () )
CP KP l i s it
s
ii t t t t t =+ + + + + +
++ − − −
αα α α α α α π 0 1 2 345 6      (7.1) 
 
where  st  stands for the cost of external financing alternative to deposits or capital. We 
argue that if α 1 0 >  this is evidence of the existence of a lending channel, provide α 3 is 
finite (not very large). We note that equation (7.1) is also in line with the loan-supply 
function derived in Kashyap and Stein (1995). In the theoretical model suggested by these 
authors the supply of loans depends on the loan security spread, on the volume of deposits 
(assumed to be out of the bank control), on the cost of raising non-deposits external 
finance, as well as on the uncertainty surrounding the future expected deposits. 
The variable st  is supposed to proxy the cost of external funds available to the banks 
(funds alternative to deposits or capital). After 1995, st  is also expected to measure the 
costs of funds obtained abroad in other EU countries. Assuming that the uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) holds we use the short-term interest rate on Portuguese interbank 
money market (Lisbor) as a proxy for the total cost of external funds at the Portuguese 
banks disposal during the sample period
23. 
As size, liquidity and capitalisation ratios may be important sources of heterogeneity 
in banks loan-supply functions, the estimated equations also include several interaction 
effects that account for these heterogeneity sources. 
Under the assumption of cointegration equation (7.1) – which explicitly allows for 
levels specific effects captured by the coefficients α 0i  – may be estimated using POLS, 
PCOLS, PDOLS or PFMOLS. We have seen above that the POLS estimator is consistent, 
but not superconsistent, if the regressors are correlated with the residuals, and that they 
may exhibit substantial biases in finite samples. Simulation results also show that the 
PCOLS estimator does not significantly improve over simple POLS (see, for instance, 
Baltagi and Kao (2000))
24. In contrast PFMOLS is superconsistent even when the 
                                                       
23 After 1995  st  may be seen as being equal to the sum of the short-term interest rate abroad,  st
* , plus 
the exchange risk premium, ϕ t , so that according to the UIP we have  ss tt t =+ * ϕ . It can be seen from the 
data that exchange risk premium, measured by ϕ ttt ss =− * is decreasing over time, converging to zero by 
97/98. 
24 This is likely to be case for Portuguese data given our small sample.   26
regressors are correlated with the residuals and the corresponding estimators also have a 
normal limit distribution. 
Using the software recently developed by Chiang and Kao (2001) we estimated our 
equations using the POLS, PCOLS, DPOLS and the PFMOLS estimators. The results 
obtained by the first three estimators are basically similar. In such regressions most 
coefficients appear non-significantly different from zero or wrong signed. In contrast the 
results supplied by the PFMOLS estimator are quite reasonable in terms of both sign and 
magnitude. The small sample, the correlation in the residuals as well as the endogeneity of 
some of the regressors probably explains these differences. For this reason, below we only 
present and comment the PFMOLS results. 
The reported equations below only consider two and not three interest rates as (7.1) 
would suggest. The point is that due to strong colinearity it is very difficult to separately 
estimate the coefficients associated with the interest rates. But the fact is that in this case 
the exclusion of it  from (7.1) is likely not to have damaging consequences for the 
interpretation of the results of the estimated equations
25. 
As a matter of fact it  turned out to be non-significant in the estimations. Therefore in 
the regressions reported in Table 5, which were obtained using PFMOLS, it was excluded. 
Below each coefficient is the computed t-statistic, which is asymptotically normal 
distributed. For each equation several cointegration tests were computed (but are not 
reported for space reasons). The null of a unit root in the residuals was always rejected, so 
that all the equations presented in Table 5 are valid cointegrating relations
26. 
Column 1 displays the results of our basic specification (equation (7.1)) with α 4  set 
equal to zero). It can readily be seen that all the coefficients are statistically significant and 
exhibit the expected sign for a loan-supply function. This, of course, is a strong piece of 
evidence favouring our identification approach
27. 
                                                       
25 If we, quite realistically, assume that it  and  st  are cointegrated we may write isk tt t =+ + ε  where k 
is a constant and ε t  a purely stochastic stationary process. The relevant part of the model may be written as 
ααα 345 lis ttt ++=αα αα α ε 34 5 4 4 ls k ttt ++ ++ () , so that by not introducing it  into the estimated model 
we are subsuming the terms α 4k  and αε 4 t  into the constant and the residuals of the resulting model 
respectively, without significant consequences on the remaining estimated coefficients. However, the 
coefficient on st  should now be seen as being equal to () αα 45 + . 
26 The panel cointegration tests computed by the NPT 1.2 package developed by Chiang and Kao (2001) 
include the five panel cointegration tests developed in Kao (1999) and four panel cointegration tests developed 
in Pedroni (1997). 
27 The fact that all the estimated coefficients have the right sign does not, of course, completely rule out 
the possibility of our estimated equation being a biased estimator of the true supply schedule. This will be the   27
Even though the estimated coefficients of lt  and st  do not seem to be much different 
in absolute terms, the null hypothesis of their being equal in magnitude (the “spread 
condition”) is statistically rejected. In fact the t-statistics for this restriction are always 
larger than two (see, bottom line of Table 5). Thus, we proceed without imposing such 
restriction in the estimated loan-supply equations.  
Given that the coefficient of ln( / ) DP ,  α 1, is significantly positive and the 
coefficient of lt ,  α 3, is finite we conclude that there is evidence of the existence of a 
credit channel in the transmission of monetary policy in Portuguese bank data. However 
the coefficient of lt  (and also the coefficient of st ) appears to be somewhat high and we 
have seen that a high interest rate elasticity of credit supply reduces the importance of the 
credit channel. 
By comparing the results in columns (1) and (2) we also see that the conclusion on 
the existence of the credit channel does not depend on whether or not the estimated 
regression includes bank capital as an additional regressor. 
The remaining equations in Table 5 interact the explanatory variables in our basic 
equation with three bank specific characteristics, which we see as potential important 
sources of bank heterogeneity: size, liquidity and capitalisation. In the table these three 
variables are denoted by zit . Our general formulation in this case reads as 
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where interactions appear in all the potentially relevant variables. 
In the case of size and capitalisation the zit  variable is taken in the form of 
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case if our specified equation is not stable in the 6-dimensional space defined by 
[ln( / ),ln( / ),ln( / ), , , ] CP DP KPl s π . In turn, this instability is likely to occur if some relevant decision 
variable is missing in our estimated equation. However, the possibility of we being estimating a demand 
equation instead of a supply equation is completely out of the question, given the signs of the estimated 
coefficients.    28
where  xit  stands for the log of total assets, as a measure of size and for the capital ratio as 
a capitalisation indicator
28. By defining size and capitalisation in this way we ensure that 
the  zit  variable captures pure differential effects. For each time period, the zit  variable 
averages to zero, being negative for banks whose specific characteristic (size and 
capitalisation ratio) is below average (these will be called small or less capitalised banks) 
and positive for banks whose specific characteristic is above average (these will be 
designated large or well capitalised banks). In case of liquidity the zit  variable is instead 
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where  xit  stands for the liquidity ratio as a measure of bank liquidity
29. The rationale for 
such a definition is the following. Theoretically, if anything, banks are expected to react to 
monetary policy according to their own concept of positive or negative excess liquidity. 
But, the concept of excess liquidity is bank specific and so it has to be seen as the 
difference between the actual liquidity ratio and what (in the banks’ opinion) is its 
optimum liquidity ratio (which is expected to vary according to bank size, the degree of 
bank risk aversion, the customers mix, etc.). If, a monetary policy shock occurs when the 
liquidity ratio is above the optimum (long run equilibrium) liquidity ratio, the bank 
reaction will be smaller (less lending channel effect) than otherwise. Definition (7.4) 
assumes that the bank specific long run equilibrium liquidity level may be proxied by the 
bank average liquidity ratio during the sample period
30. If, with the zit  variable as defined 























()( ) ββ ββ    (7.5) 
                                                       
28  The capital ratio is computed as “capital and reserves” over total assets. 
29 The liquidity ratio is computed as the sum of cash plus inter-bank deposits plus government securities 
divided by total assets. 
30 In samples in which general positive excess liquidity during a large period of time is not compensated 
by an equally long period of negative excess liquidity, it may be the case that the sample average liquidity 
ratio is not a good proxy for the long run equilibrium liquidity ratio. This is also to be the case whenever the 
time dimension of the panel is too short (so that it does not allow computing a meaningful bank average 
liquidity ratio) or too long (in this case one should allow for a time varying optimum long run equilibrium 
liquidity ratio)    29
Table 5 
PFMOLS estimates of equations (7.1) and (7.2) 





(2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
































































































































Spread  restriction  (4.30)  (2.98) --- (8.79) ---  ---  --- (3.81) 
Legend: 
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
ln( / ) DP = natural log of total deposits deflated by the consumer price index 
ln( / ) KP = natural log of total capital deflated by the consumer price index 
lt = interest rate on long term loans in decimals (five year loans) 
st = short term interest rate on Portuguese money market in decimals (Lisbor) 
π t = inflation rate in decimals (fourth differences of log CPI) 
zit = measure of bank specific characteristic (size, liquidity or capitalisation)   30
where  x  is the overall average liquidity ratio (computed over all banks for the whole 
sample period). From (7.5) we conclude that (7.4) allows one to account for periods of 
general (positive or negative) excess liquidity for the banking sector as whole. This is a 
very important issue in the Portuguese banking system, as we will see below. 
For expository purposes let us take the model in column (3) of Table 5. The fact that 
the coefficient on ln( / ) DPz it it  is positive means that the coefficient on deposits is lower 
for small banks and so in the Portuguese case the supply of loans of small banks is less 
deposit dependent than that of large banks. In other words, everything else equal, we 
would conclude that the credit channel is less important for small banks. This conclusion 
runs against to what one could expect according to economic theory. 
As shown in section 3, one cannot, in general, conclude on the relative importance of 
the credit channel just by looking at the coefficient of deposits, because the importance of 
the credit channel also depends on the slope of the supply curve that is on the coefficient 
of  lt . So, if we allow for a changing coefficient on deposits according to bank size, we 
must also allow for a changing coefficient of the loans interest rate, lt , according to size 
(and similarly for the coefficient of st ). In other words, in terms of equation (7.2), to 
conclude on the relative magnitude of the credit channel for two different banks one has to 
look not only at the coefficient of ln( / ) DPz it it ,  β 2 , but also at the coefficient of lz ti t , 
β 6 , as the effect of a decrease in the coefficient of deposits could be offset by an increase 
on the coefficient of the loans-interest rate, and vice versa.  
In our case it turns out that the coefficients on the interaction terms lz ti t  and sz ti t  are 
both not statistically different from zero and so, we may definitely conclude that small 
Portuguese banks are less dependent on deposits than large banks or, in other words, the 
credit channel appears to be less important for small banks
31. We recognise that the lack of 
evidence of larger non-deposit external financing costs for smaller banks does not come as 
a large surprise in the Portuguese case. Portugal is a small country with a not very large 
number of banks and in which even the smaller banks are large enough not to be 
discriminated in the access to markets for non-deposits external funds
32. 
                                                       
31 We note that the coefficient of ln( / ) KP  in column (3) is wrong signed, but the above conclusion still 
holds for the model in column (4), which was estimated after dropping ln( / ) KP it  and ln( / ) KPz it it  and 
after checking that the coefficients on lz ti t and  sz ti t were still statistically not different from zero. However 
in column (4) the estimated coefficient of ln( / ) DPz it it  is much smaller and the t-statistic is not very high in 
relative terms. 
32 We recall that according to Table 2 small banks were net debtors in the domestic money market while 
large banks were net creditors.   31
Columns (5) and (6) display the models with liquidity as the bank specific 
characteristic. The first important point to note is that both the coefficients of 
ln( / ) DPz it it  and ln( / ) KPz it it  are statistically not different from zero. The fact that the 
coefficient of ln( / ) DPz it it  is zero means that in the Portuguese case the dependence of 
banks on deposits does not depend on the bank liquidity ratio
33. On the other hand, it turns 
out that the coefficient of the credit interest rate is lower for illiquid banks
34 (as the 
coefficient of lz ti t  is positive) and this means that the supply curve is flatter. This reduces 
the importance of the credit channel for the illiquid banks. As we have seen, due to the 
existence of credit ceilings and compulsory minimum ratios of public debt, the Portuguese 
banks displayed a huge liquidity ratio at the beginning of the sample period, which 
steadily decreased later (after 1995 banks were also able to progressively sell the public 
debt to foreign banks). This also means that in our case, using the sample average to proxy 
the long run equilibrium liquidity ratio is probably not a good solution, because it implies 
that (almost) all the banks exhibited excess liquidity during the first half of the sample and 
scarcity of liquidity during the second half of the sample, when in fact it may have been 
the case as the data suggest (the liquidity ratio further decreased in 1998) that the liquidity 
ratio was above the true long run equilibrium level all over the sample period. So, it may 
well be the case that the coefficients of lz ti t  and of sz ti t  appear significantly different 
from zero because they are capturing the effects of a potential structural break occurring in 
the period, as we shall see below. All in all, a sensible conclusion seems to be that 
liquidity in the Portuguese banks, during the nineties has not played the role of a shield 
against monetary policy shocks. 
Columns (7) and (8) display the two models estimated with the capitalisation ratio as 
the interaction variable. In this case we have β 2 0 <  and β β 68 0 == , and thus, we can 
definitely conclude that the credit channel appears to be more important for less 
capitalised banks.  
Let us now address the stability issue. The above conclusions are valid under the 
implicit assumption that the models estimated in Table 5 are stable. But if we look again 
at Chart 1 we immediately realise that during 1996 and 1997 the credit growth rate 
increased relative to the deposits growth rate, coinciding with the increase in the external 
non-deposits funds coming from abroad (actually, this characteristic in the data is still 
                                                       
33 We note that this conclusion depends on the fact that the liquidity variable is defined as in (8.4). If we 
rather define liquidity as in (8.3) the coefficient of ln( / ) DPz it it  appears significantly different from zero and 
negative. This result shows that the way the zit  is defined really matters for the empirical analysis.  
34 Remember that an illiquid bank is one for which the current liquidity ratio is below the long run 
equilibrium liquidity ratio (proxied by the sample average liquidity ratio).   32
 
Table 6 
PFMOLS estimates of equation (7.6) 





(2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





























































































































































































Spread restriction  (-1.45)  (-0.56)  ---  (0.02)  ---  ---  ---  (-0.15) 
Legend: see Table 5. 
   33
stronger during 1998 and 1999). This fact raises the question of whether the conclusions 
above still apply once we allow for the possibility of a structural break in the last two 
years of the sample. 
To investigate this issue we “interacted” the variables in our basic specification with 
a dummy variable, which is zero for the first six years of data (1990/1 to 1995/4) and 
equals 1 for the two last years of the sample (1996/1 to 1997/4). This variable is denoted 
by d96 in Table 6 below and in our new equation whose basic formulation now reads as 
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   (7.6) 
 
Notice that model (7.6) collapses into model (7.2) for the period 1990/1-1995/4. For 
the period 1996/1-1997/4, the coefficient of ln( / ) DP is given by () β α 11 +  and 
similarly for the coefficients of ln( / ) KP , lt  and st . 
First, it is important to note that according to Table 6 there seems to be a strong 
evidence of a structural break occurring in the two last years of the sample. In fact, with 
the exception of the model in column (6), the coefficients of the variables of the model 
interacted with the dummy variable d96 are in general significantly different from zero. It 
seems however that our liquidity variable basically accounts for the structural break 
occurred in the last part of the sample. In fact, in the Portuguese case, the liquidity ratio 
may be seen as a sort of “summary” variable that encompasses the main changes that the 
Portuguese banking sector underwent over the nineties
35. 
                                                       
35 The results of the two models displayed in columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 are somewhat puzzling. 
According to the model with the capital variable in column (5) there seems to be a structural break, as the 
coefficients of the variables interacted with the dummy variable are significantly different from zero. 
However, a different conclusion emerges when we look at the model in column (6), as the coefficients of the 
variables interacted with the dummy variable are all not different from zero. There are two alternative 
econometric explanations for such an outcome: 1) if model in column (5) is the true model the results obtained 
in column (6) stem from an omitted regressors misspecification bias and 2) if the model in column (6) is the 
true model the results in column (5) are due to an over-parameterisation of the estimated model. Of course, in 
this latter case it would mean that the introduction of the liquidity ratio in our basic specification is sufficient 
to account for the structural break. Notice that the model in column (6) in table 6 reduces to the model in 
column (6) of table 5 if we drop the (non significant) coefficients of the variables interacted with the dummy 
variable.   34
Also important to note is that now the spread restriction is met for the period 
1996/1997, even though it is still not met for the period 1990/1995
36.  
However the most important point is that all the relevant conclusions drawn above 
from Table 5 remain valid for Table 6. In fact, the first two columns allow us to conclude 
for the existence of the credit channel (β 1 0 >  and β 5 0 > , but finite). From columns (3) 
and (4) we conclude that large banks are more deposit dependent than small banks. From 
column (5) and (6) we once again conclude that the dependence of banks on deposits does 
not depend on the bank liquidity ratio and that the supply curve of illiquid banks is flatter 
(as the coefficient of lz ti t  is positive). And once again from columns (7) and (8) we 
conclude that the credit channel is more important for the less capitalised banks. 
A cautionary note on the above conclusions is now in order. A puzzling result 
emerging from Table 6 is that the estimated α 1 is always positive (with the exception of 
the model in column (6)). At a first thought one would expect this coefficient to be zero or 
even negative to reflect the “expected” smaller banks’ dependence on deposits, given the 
possibility of access to foreign markets for external funds after 1995. We note however 
that the coefficient of deposits is expected to measure the percentage increase of credit 
associated to an increase of one percent in deposits. All else equal, if during a given time 
period the data exhibit an increase in the credit growth rate larger than the increase in the 
deposits growth rate, this will tend to show up in a larger coefficient β 1 (i.e., α 1 0 > ) 
unless due account is taken in the model for this potential “structural break”. But in the 
Portuguese case there seems to be a reasonable explanation for the coefficient α 1 to be 
positive in Table 6. One important feature of the Portuguese aggregate bank data is the 
huge decrease of liquidity throughout the sample period. The liquidity ratio decreased 
from 37.4 per cent in 1992 to 27 per cent in 1995, to 21 per cent in 1997 and further to 
17.1 per cent in 1998. The evolution of the liquidity ratio very much reflects the changes 
the banking sector underwent during the nineties. In the beginning of the nineties, the 
existence of credit limits forced banks to operate with excess liquidity. After the abolition 
of credit limits in 1991 the banks were theoretically free to get rid of that excess liquidity, 
but then the exchange rate crisis of 1992 occurred. Only after the economic downturn of 
1993-1994 banks were able to finance an increasing demand for credit by selling their 
Portuguese government bond holdings to foreign banks. This resulted in a reduction of the 
liquidity ratio, which probably explains why banks appear more deposit dependent in the 
two last years of the sample (α 1 0 > ) in Table 6. So, in the Portuguese case it may well 
be the case that for liquidity reasons bank deposit dependency has increased over time in 
                                                       
36 The bottom row of Table 6 reports the t-statistics for the restriction () () βα βα 55 77 0 +++= , which 
is the spread condition for the period 1996/1-1997/4.   35
contrast to what the possibility of accessing foreign markets could suggest. The 
reasonability of this explanation is enhanced by the fact that the apparent larger 
dependence of deposits disappears in the model of column (6), which accounts for 
liquidity effect
37. 
But, of course, the fact that the estimated α 1 is positive may alternatively be seen as 
a sign that we are not being able of correctly modelling the structural break occurred in 
last two years of the sample. From this point of view there are also some reasons that 
could be invoked to explain why it might also be the case that the estimated equations are 
not adequately capturing the entire relevant characteristics of the data. One major 
limitation of our approach regards the theoretical model behind our estimated equation. As 
we have seen, underlying our estimated equation is the assumption that banks cannot 
control deposits and capital (in the sense that these are not decision variables of the banks 
when they maximise profits) but are able to control the amount of external funds (other 
than deposits and capital). How realistic this assumption is in the Portuguese case is an 
open issue. Of course deposits are not completely controlled by banks, but they do not 
seem to be completely exogenous either
38. At least in the medium or long run it seems 
reasonable to argue that banks may be able to influence the amount of their own deposits. 
The same argument applies to capital as it includes non-distributed profits. So, treating 
deposits and capital as totally exogenous, as we did, is probably an oversimplification. We 
note, however that our approach is still valid even if deposits are endogenous, but then we 
                                                       
37 Also, if we include the liquidity variable as an additional regressor in the model of column (8) of 
Table 6 to account for the structural break it turns out that the coefficients of ld t 96  and  sd t 96 become clearly 
non significant (the t statistics drops to 0.17 and –0.01, respectively) and the coefficient of ln( / ) DP d 96  even 
tough still remaining significantly different from zero, its point estimate as well as its t-statistics also decrease 
(to 0.054 and 3.23, respectively). This result highlights two important aspects: i) the inclusion of the liquidity 
ratio as an independent variable in the model of column (8) accounts for most of the detected structural break 
and ii) the fact that the coefficient of ln( / ) DP z it  still remains significant is an important piece of evidence 
that capitalisation in the model is not simply proxying the structural break, but rather explaining bank 
behaviour.  
38 If deposits were completely controlled by banks, the central bank would no longer be able to control 
the aggregate deposits and so, there would not be any lending channel at the aggregate level. In a theoretical 
model of the lending channel, Stein (1998) allows interbank competition for deposits, but clearly assumes that 
the central bank can control the bank reserves. It is not clear how these two assumptions may be reconciled at 
an aggregate level. It seems to us that if one assumes that the central bank can control the aggregate amount of 
deposits, then banks can only be allowed to compete for a “market share” of deposits. But in this case the 
obvious adding up restriction must be taken into account.   36
need some other assumption to ensure identification of the loan supply schedule (and also 
a different theoretical model to justify including the deposits variable as a regressor in our 
supply equation). 
On the other hand treating external funds as completely endogenous when the supply 
conditions of these funds completely changed during the estimation period with the 
possibility of accessing funds from foreign banks, is also probably not a satisfactory 
simplification. 
Another potential explanation for the results is that our measure of costs of external 
funds (the Lisbor interest rate) may not be a good proxy for the true costs of external 
funds for banks, which in turn may explain why the “spread condition” is rejected for the 
period 1990/1995. 
Finally, the changes that the banking sector underwent during the nineties, which 
include the alterations of the competitive context with the huge increase in the number of 
banks, the re-privatisation process and several merging operations, are also potential 




This paper investigates the existence of a bank-lending channel using quarterly data on the 
Portuguese banks for the period 1990-1997.  
In contrast to previous approaches which basically resort to (dynamic) reduced form 
equations for bank credit with variables in differences, this paper proposes an alternative 
approach by estimating directly a “structural” loan supply schedule with variables in 
levels, thereby exploiting recent cointegration results for nonstationary panel data. 
We conclude for the existence of a lending channel in Portuguese data and that the 
importance of this channel is larger for the less capitalised banks. Size as well as liquidity 
does not appear to be relevant bank characteristics to determine the importance of the 
lending channel. However, the existence of a “structural break” during the sample period 
reflected by the possibility of Portuguese banks to access external funds from foreign EU 
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Appendix 1 - Reduced form equations of the model in section 4  
 
In this appendix we derive the reduced form equations for lt  and ln( / ) CP t  
corresponding to model discussed in section 4, i.e., the model composed of equations  
(3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (4.1) with γ 2 0 = . 
For ease of presentation we start by repeating the equations of the model:  
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From (A1.1) and (A1.2) we get the equilibrium solution for the money market: 
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Finally substituting (A1.5) and (A1.6) into (A1.9) and (A1.10) we get the reduced 
form equations for lt  and ln( / ) CP t . The reduced form for ln( / ) CP t , which is 
equation (4.2) in the main text, reads as: 
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α λ β γ α λ α λ γ
λαβγ
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θρ δρ µ
α λ β γ γ α λ α λ
λαβγ
71 1 5 1
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